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The choice firm / market: the importance of internal control as a mean to reduce the transaction costs

L'arbitrage entreprise/marché: le rôle du contrôle interne, outil de réduction des coûts de transaction

Eustache Ebondo and Benoît Pigé ()
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Benoît Pigé: LEG - Laboratoire d'Economie et de Gestion - UB - Université de Bourgogne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: Since 1937 and the Coase article, the distinction between the enterprise and the market seems to repose on the costs transaction economy. The enterprise advantage is of being able to manage some transactions at a lesser cost than the market, due to the existence of internal control mechanisms which authorize a better appreciation of transactions specificity and allow a limitation of opportunism when there is information asymmetry. The new information and communication technologies' development, cumulated with the augmentation and the specialization of the knowledge, induces the need to think again the distinction between the firm and the market and specifically the internal control mechanisms which are to be implemented.

Date: 2002
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-03425754v1
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Published in Comptabilité Contrôle Audit / Accounting Auditing Control, 2002, 8 (2), pp.51. ⟨10.3917/cca.082.0051⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-03425754

DOI: 10.3917/cca.082.0051

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