 Competition and Regulation Challenges in Digital Markets: How to Tackle the Issue of Self-Preferencing?Post-Print from HAL Abstract: This contribution deals with the application of competition rules in the digital sector and, in particular, the distortions that can result from self-preferencing strategies. In the context of the European Commission's Digital Markets Act project and the UK's plans to regulate the major digital ecosystems, the aim is to examine the relative effectiveness of the current effects-based approach stemming from competition law enforcement, the use of per-se rules, the implementation of specific regulation or the imposition of structural remedies to address such risks. It is a question of insisting on the objectives pursued (maximisation of consumer welfare, dynamic efficiency, contestability of market positions and fairness) and on the conditions for the implementation of hybrid approaches combining the logic of sectoral regulation and procedures rooted in the enforcement of competition rules. Keywords: Self-preferencing; abuse of dominant position; digital markets; exclusionary abuses (search for similar items in EconPapers) Published in Eduardo Molan Gaban and Vinicius Klein. Concorrência e Inovaçãos: Reflexões e Insights, 109-141, Instituto Brasileiro de Concorrência e Inovaçãos, 2021, 9786599653605 There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it. Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-03427287 Access Statistics for this paper More papers in Post-Print from HAL |
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