 Vers un virage algorithmique de la lutte anticartels ?Nathalie de Marcellis-Warin,
Frédéric Marty and
Thierry Warin
Post-Print from HAL Abstract: Since the seminal works of Ezrachi and Stucke (2015, 2016) on algorithmic collusion, the question of cartels supported or even prompted by pricing algorithms has occupied an important place in the literature of industrial economics and competition law. The purpose of this contribution is to analyze the extent to which monitoring algorithms to ensure the control and detection of possible algorithmic cartels themselves raise issues not only in the economic and legal fields but also in the ethical field. In this paper, we wish to analyze both the opportunities and the risks for competition authorities of the use of "algorithmic evidence" both at the level of the explicability of the result and of possible biases that may be introduced in the final result as well as at the level of their accountability to explain their decisions. Keywords: pricing algorithm; algorithmic collusion; algorithmic governance; algorithmic evidence; explicability; bias; accountability; algorithme de prix; collusion algorithmique; gouvernance algorithmique; preuve algorithmique; explicabilité; biais; redevabilité (search for similar items in EconPapers) Published in Éthique publique : Revue internationale d'éthique sociétale et gouvernementale, 2022, La gouvernance algorithmique, 23 (2-2021) There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it. Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-03589981 Access Statistics for this paper More papers in Post-Print from HAL |
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