Myopic and farsighted stable sets in 2-player strategic-form games

Francis Bloch and Annevan den Nouwelandb
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Annevan den Nouwelandb: University of Oregon [Eugene]

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Abstract: This paper revisits the analysis of stable sets in two-player strategic-form games. Our two main contributions are (i) to establish a connection between myopic stable sets and the stable matchings of an auxiliary two-sided matching problem and (ii) to identify a structural property of 2-player games, called "the block partition property," which helps characterize the strategy profiles that are indirectly dominated by a fixed profile. Our analysis also generalizes and unifies existing results on myopic and farsighted stable sets in 2-player games.

Keywords: Strategic-form game; Myopic stable set; Farsighted stable set; Core (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021-11
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-03672258v1
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Published in Games and Economic Behavior, 2021, 130, pp.663-683. ⟨10.1016/j.geb.2021.10.004⟩

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Journal Article: Myopic and farsighted stable sets in 2-player strategic-form games (2021)
Working Paper: Myopic and farsighted stable sets in 2-player strategic-form games (2021)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-03672258

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2021.10.004

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