Why Is Exclusivity in Broadcasting Rights Prevalent and Why Does Simple Regulation Fail?

David Martimort () and Jerome Pouyet ()
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David Martimort: TSE-R - Toulouse School of Economics - UT Capitole - Université Toulouse Capitole - Comue de Toulouse - Communauté d'universités et établissements de Toulouse - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement
Jerome Pouyet: ESSEC Business School and THEMA (UMR 8184) - ESSEC Business School - THEMA - Théorie économique, modélisation et applications - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - CY - CY Cergy Paris Université

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Abstract: Pay-TV firms compete both downstream to attract viewers and upstream to acquire broadcasting rights. Because profits inherited from downstream competition satisfy a convexity property, allocating rights to the dominant firm maximizes the industry profit. Such an exclusive allocation of rights emerges as a robust equilibrium outcome but may fail to maximize welfare. We analyze whether a ban on resale and a ban on package bidding may improve welfare. These corrective policies have no impact on the final allocation but lead to profit redistribution along the value chain.

Keywords: Broadcasting rights; Upstream and downstream competition; Exclusivity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025-12-22
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-03714970v3
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Published in RAND Journal of Economics, 2025, 42 p. ⟨10.1111/1756-2171.70039⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-03714970

DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.70039

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