Jeu de l'investissement et coordination par les intentions: des résultats expérimentaux

Claude Meidinger (), Stéphane Robin and Bernard Ruffieux
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Claude Meidinger: TEAM - Théories et Applications en Microéconomie et Macroéconomie - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
Stéphane Robin: IREPD - Institut de Recherche Économique sur la Production et le Développement - UPMF - Université Pierre Mendès France - Grenoble 2 - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
Bernard Ruffieux: IREPD - Institut de Recherche Économique sur la Production et le Développement - UPMF - Université Pierre Mendès France - Grenoble 2 - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: This paper presents some experimental results that focus on players' coordination on Pareto-optimal issues of the investment game. These results show the importance of communication of intentions as a mechanism for facilitating such a coordination in different contexts (simultaneous or sequential game, with or without cheap talk, repeated game with or without a mediator).

Keywords: experimental economics; games; coordination; reciprocity; économie expérimentale; jeu; réciprocité (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000-03
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-03718517v1
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Published in 2000

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-03718517

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