Values in Welfare Economics

Antoinette Baujard

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Abstract: This chapter focuses on the inner rationale and consequences of four different archetypal positions regarding how ethical and political values are tackled in welfare economics. Welfare economics is standardly associated with the welfarist framework, for which social welfare is based on individual utility only. Beyond this, we distinguish the value-neutrality claim – for which ethical values should be and are out of the scope of welfare economics –, the value confinement ideal – for which ethical values are acceptable if they are minimal and consensual–, the transparency requirement – for which any ethical values may be acceptable in the welfare economics framework if explicit and formalized –, and the entanglement claim – which challenges the very possibility of demarcation between facts and values.

Keywords: Welfare economics; facts and values; value judgement; welfarism; transparency; demarcation; normative and positive; neutrality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021-11-30
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Published in Conrad Heilmann; Julian Reiss. The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Economics, Routledge, pp.211-222, 2021, The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Economics, 9781138824201. ⟨10.4324/9781315739793-19⟩

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Working Paper: Values in Welfare economics (2021)
Working Paper: Values in Welfare economics (2021)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-03894792

DOI: 10.4324/9781315739793-19

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