Education Transmission and Network Formation

Vincent Boucher, Carlo del Bello, Fabrizio Panebianco, Thierry Verdier and Yves Zenou
Additional contact information
Carlo del Bello: Italian Tax Agency
Fabrizio Panebianco: Catholic University of Milan
Yves Zenou: Monash university, CEPR - Center for Economic Policy Research, IZA - Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit - Institute of Labor Economics

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Abstract: We propose a model of intergenerational transmission of education wherein children belong to either highly educated or low-educated families. Children choose the intensity of their social activities, while parents decide how much educational effort to exert. Using Add Health data, we find that, on average, children's homophily acts as a complement to the educational effort of highly educated parents but as a substitute for the educational effort of low-educated parents. We also find that policies that subsidize kids' socialization efforts can backfire for low-educated students because they tend to increase their interactions with other low-educated students.

Date: 2023-01
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

Published in Journal of Labor Economics, 2023, 41 (1), pp.129-173. ⟨10.1086/718981⟩

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Related works:
Journal Article: Education Transmission and Network Formation (2023)
Working Paper: Education Transmission and Network Formation (2023)
Working Paper: Education Transmission and Network Formation (2021)
Working Paper: Education Transmission and Network Formation (2020)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-03953926

DOI: 10.1086/718981

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