Optimal contracts under adverse selection for staple goods such as energy: Effectiveness of in-kind insurance

Corinne Chaton, Clémence Alasseur () and Emma Hubert ()

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Keywords: Contract theory; Adverse selection; In-kind insurance; Fuel poverty; Calculus of variations (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022-02-01
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Published in Energy Economics, 2022, 106, ⟨10.1016/j.eneco.2021.105785⟩

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Journal Article: Optimal contracts under adverse selection for staple goods such as energy: Effectiveness of in-kind insurance (2022)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-03983355

DOI: 10.1016/j.eneco.2021.105785

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