Optimal contracts under adverse selection for staple goods such as energy: Effectiveness of in-kind insurance

Clémence Alasseur (), Corinne Chaton and Emma Hubert ()
Additional contact information
Emma Hubert: ORFE - Department of Operations Research and Financial Engineering - Princeton University

Post-Print from HAL

Keywords: Fuel poverty; Calculus of variations; In-kind insurance; Adverse selection; Contract theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022-02-01
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Published in Energy Economics, 2022, 106, pp.105785. ⟨10.1016/j.eneco.2021.105785⟩

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
Journal Article: Optimal contracts under adverse selection for staple goods such as energy: Effectiveness of in-kind insurance (2022)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-03983355

DOI: 10.1016/j.eneco.2021.105785

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Post-Print from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().