Selecting a winner with external referees

Francis Bloch (), Bhaskar Dutta () and Marcin Dziubiński ()
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Francis Bloch: PSE - Paris School of Economics - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, PJSE - Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement
Bhaskar Dutta: University of Warwick [Coventry], Ashoka University
Marcin Dziubiński: UW - Uniwersytet Warszawski [Polska] = University of Warsaw [Poland] = Université de Varsovie [Pologne]

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Abstract: We consider a problem of mechanism design without money, where a planner selects a winner among a set of agents with binary types and receives outside signals (like the report of external referees). We show that there is a gap between the optimal Dominant Strategy Incentive Compatible (DSIC) mechanism and the optimal Bayesian Incentive Compatible (BIC) mechanism. In the optimal BIC mechanism, the planner can leverage the outside signal to elicit information about agents' types. BIC mechanisms are lexicographic mechanisms, where the planner first shortlists agents who receive high reports from the referees and then uses agents' reports to break ties among agents in the shortlist. We compare the "self-evaluation" mechanism with a "peer evaluation" mechanism where agents evaluate other agents, and show that for the same signal precision, the self- evaluation mechanism outperforms the peer evaluation mechanism. We show that optimal Ex Post Incentive Compatible (EPIC) mechanisms give the planner an intermediate value between the optimal DSIC and BIC mechanisms

Keywords: Peer selection; Mechanism design without money; Bayesian incentive compatibility; Dominant strategy incentive compatibility; Ex post incentive compatibility (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023-07
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Published in Journal of Economic Theory, 2023, 211, ⟨10.1016/j.jet.2023.105687⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-04155070

DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2023.105687

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