The dynamics of revolution: Discrimination, social unrest and the optimal timing of revolution

Carmen Camacho () and Waleed Hassan
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Carmen Camacho: PSE - Paris School of Economics - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, PJSE - Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement
Waleed Hassan: UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne, KU Leuven - Catholic University of Leuven = Katholieke Universiteit Leuven

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Abstract: What makes a social movement turn into a revolution? This study explores the factors that influence this evolution, examining the economic and social elements that impact the timing of this profound event. By analyzing the dynamics of social unrest, we investigate discrimination, organizational skills, wage inequalities, and retaliation as key elements shaping the course of social unrest. Our objective is to identify the precise moment when a social movement transitions into a revolution, optimizing the well-being of marginalized workers. Our findings reveal that if unrest continues to grow over time and if a revolution results in a net welfare gain for the discriminated workers, then a revolution will occur regardless of the initial state of the economy. It is worth noting that a revolution can occur even if the social movement loses momentum, provided that the initial level of discontent is significant or the system is so repressive that a revolution becomes necessary.

Keywords: Social unrest; Revolution dynamics; Wage inequality; Optimal switching time (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023-11
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Published in Economic Modelling, 2023, 128, ⟨10.1016/j.econmod.2023.106489⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-04331116

DOI: 10.1016/j.econmod.2023.106489

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