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French Yellow vests resistance to transport pricing reform

Stéphanie Souche ()
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Stéphanie Souche: LAET - Laboratoire Aménagement Économie Transports - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - ENTPE - École Nationale des Travaux Publics de l'État - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: Under the background of the French "Yellow vests" movement, the present paper tests hypothesis about why people oppose pricing reform. Focusing on motivation, we analyze the change unfairness induces by a transport pricing reform. We use a Structural Equation Model on a new transport pricing instrument applied to Lyon Metropolitan Area (France). Our results show resistance to pricing can be perceived through latent variables linked to the perceived unfairness of the pricing change. In accordance with the literature, we found that there is a self-interest motivation to road pricing fairness that involves the expected compensation and a moral motivation that involves compliance with moral principles. In particular, our results point out a hierarchy between these two motives in favor of the moral one. Our findings also show the significant role of two class of context, meaning road pricing scheme need to be city adapted.

Keywords: Structural equation modeling; Travel behavior motive; Fairness; Urban road pricing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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Published in International Journal of Transport Economics, 2019, XLVI (3), pp.123-147. ⟨10.19272/201906703006⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-04665710

DOI: 10.19272/201906703006

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