EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

MANDATORY INTEGRATION AGREEMENTS FOR UNEMPLOYED JOB SEEKERS: A RANDOMIZED CONTROLLED FIELD EXPERIMENT IN GERMANY

Gerard van den Berg, Barbara Hofmann, Gesine Stephan and Arne Uhlendorff
Additional contact information
Gesine Stephan: Active Labor Market Policy - Institute for Employment Research

Post-Print from HAL

Abstract: Abstract Integration agreements (IAs) are contracts between the employment agency and the unemployed, nudging the latter to comply with rules on search behavior. We designed and implemented a randomized controlled trial involving thousands of newly unemployed workers, randomizing at the individual level both the timing of the IA and whether it is announced in advance. Administrative records provide outcomes. Novel theoretical and methodological insights provide tools to detect anticipation and suggest estimation by individual baseline employability. The positive effect on entering employment is driven by individuals with adverse prospects. For them, early IA increase reemployment within a year from 53% to 61%.

Date: 2024-11-15
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp and nep-nud
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-04793414v1
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Published in International Economic Review, 2024, ⟨10.1111/iere.12745⟩

Downloads: (external link)
https://shs.hal.science/halshs-04793414v1/document (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: MANDATORY INTEGRATION AGREEMENTS FOR UNEMPLOYED JOB SEEKERS: A RANDOMIZED CONTROLLED FIELD EXPERIMENT IN GERMANY (2025) Downloads
Working Paper: Mandatory integration agreements for unemployed job seekers: a randomized controlled field experiment in Germany (2021) Downloads
Working Paper: Mandatory Integration Agreements for Unemployed Job Seekers: A Randomized Controlled Field Experiment in Germany (2021) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-04793414

DOI: 10.1111/iere.12745

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Post-Print from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-31
Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-04793414