Managerialism versus free and fair competition: The economists’ aggiornamento on the Sherman Act on the eve of the 1932 elections

Frédéric Marty ()
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Frédéric Marty: GREDEG - Groupe de Recherche en Droit, Economie et Gestion - UNS - Université Nice Sophia Antipolis (1965 - 2019) - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - UniCA - Université Côte d'Azur

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Abstract: This contribution discusses the historical background of the Fetter Petition, published in 1932 by a committee of American economists who came together to defend the Sherman Act. Until then, different schools of thought had held conflicting views on the relevance of the Sherman Act from an economic perspective, with some even defending the option of managed competition. The Fetter Petition, however, shows a convergence around the defence of the Sherman Act and support for its stronger enforcement. The paper sheds light on the moment of consensus building among economists around antitrust rules as a result of proposals to reform and amend them between 1928 and 1932. It also draws a parallel between some of the recommendations of the Fetter Petition and the policy pursued by Thurman Arnold from 1938 onwards, and opens a discussion on the contributions of the 1930s debates to current discussions on the theoretical foundations of competition policy.

Keywords: antitrust; managed competition; New Deal; information exchanges (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Published in Justin Lindeboom. Cambridge Handbook on Theoretical Foundations of Antitrust and Competition Law, inPress

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-04828360

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