 Financer son rival. Quand les États-Unis et l'Europe investissent dans la tech chinoiseMathilde Velliet ()
Post-Print from HAL Abstract: Outbound investments targeting rival powers are receiving increasing political attention on both sides of the Atlantic. As projects to screen and restrict these flows are being developed, public authorities are seeking information to enhance their understanding of financial dynamics directed towards countries like China. Official documents that pave the way for future restrictions target four rapidly growing sectors: artificial intelligence (AI), biotechnology, semiconductors, and quantum computing and communication. Using Crunchbase data, this study maps European and American investments in these four Chinese sectors from 2003 to 2023, aiming to identify the nature and dynamics of these investments and spot any potentially problematic transactions. It is important to note that the share of European and American investments is limited — three-quarters of transactions in these sectors are carried out by Chinese investors, with European and American investors participating in only 12% of investment cycles — and is declining. European investments, in particular, are very modest. The landscape is dominated by Germany (49 transactions since 2003) and France (36), primarily investing in artificial intelligence. France's total can be attributed to the major role of Cathay Capital, the leading European investor, while German investments are marked by the significance of corporate venture capital, linked to major industrial groups such as Bosch, BASF, or Continental. Only two transactions (Italian and German) were identified as potentially problematic: one targeting a company in the Chinese quantum sector (linked to the CCP and the military), and the other aimed at SJ Semi, listed on American sanction lists for its ties to the Chinese military. Investments from the United States are much more numerous (1,602 between 2003 and 2023), making the U.S. the leading foreign investor in Chinese tech. These investments are also more diversified, primarily targeting biotechnology and AI. We identified several cases of American investments in quantum sector companies or companies on U.S. sanction lists. Among the top 10 American investors, 7 have invested in Chinese companies currently sanctioned by the U.S. for their ties to the military, involvement in human rights violations, or actions contrary to American foreign policy interests. This study also highlights the lack of transparency in these flows — with transactions and their amounts being insufficiently disclosed — and the existence of intermediary structures, which further complicates the equation for determining the nationality of investors. As the debate intensifies on the relevance of restricting certain transactions to China, a first step in political decisions should be to encourage greater transparency in private equity firms that fund the development of technologies deemed strategic. The complexity of transactions and lack of available data condition any political action to renewed investment in states' analytical capacities. Keywords: Technology; United States; Europe; China; Technological competition; Outbound investment; Investissements; Etats-Unis; Chine; Compétition technologique; technologies (search for similar items in EconPapers) Published in Études de l’Ifri, 2024 Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-04868597 Access Statistics for this paper More papers in Post-Print from HAL |
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