(Pro)-Social Learning and Strategic Disclosure

Nikhil Vellodi () and Roland Bénabou
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Nikhil Vellodi: PSE - Paris School of Economics - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, PJSE - Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement
Roland Bénabou: Princeton University, NBER - National Bureau of Economic Research [New York] - NBER - The National Bureau of Economic Research, CEPR - Center for Economic Policy Research, IZA - Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit - Institute of Labor Economics, BREAD

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Abstract: We study a sequential experimentation model with endogenous feedback. Agents choose between a safe and risky action, the latter generating stochastic rewards. When making this choice, each agent is selfishly motivated (myopic). However, agents can disclose their experiences to a public record, and when doing so are pro-socially motivated (forward-looking). When prior uncertainty is large, disclosure is both polarized (only extreme signals are disclosed) and positively biased (no feedback is bad news). When prior uncertainty is small, a novel form of unraveling occurs and disclosure is complete. Subsidizing disclosure costs can perversely lead to less disclosure but more experimentation.

Keywords: Social learning; Experimentation; Dynamic disclosure; Consumer reviews; Time-inconsistent preferences; Motivated beliefs (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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Published in American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, In press, ⟨10.3386/w32483⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-04929022

DOI: 10.3386/w32483

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