Comparing the manipulability of approval, evaluative and plurality voting with trichotomous preferences

Jérôme Serais (), Dominique Lepelley, Hatem Smaoui () and Abdelhalim El Ouafdi
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Jérôme Serais: CREM - Centre de recherche en économie et management - UNICAEN - Université de Caen Normandie - NU - Normandie Université - UR - Université de Rennes - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
Dominique Lepelley: CEMOI - Centre d'Économie et de Management de l'Océan Indien - UR - Université de La Réunion
Hatem Smaoui: CEMOI - Centre d'Économie et de Management de l'Océan Indien - UR - Université de La Réunion
Abdelhalim El Ouafdi: UCA - Université Cadi Ayyad [Marrakech]

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Abstract: We consider a framework where voters' preferences are supposed to be trichotomous and only three candidates are in contention. We compare the following three voting rules on the basis of their vulnerability to strategic manipulation by coalitions of voters: (2,1,0)-evaluative voting (EV), approval voting (AV) and plurality voting (PV). We first assume that the voters do not react to the deviation of some of them from their sincere preferences (naive behavior) and we show that AV dominates PV which dominates EV. We then take into consideration the possible reactions of voters (non-naive behavior) and we demonstrate that AV still dominates PV and EV, but that EV becomes less manipulable than PV.

Keywords: Evaluative voting; Approval voting; Coalitional manipulability; Probability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022-07-19
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Published in SN Business & Economics, 2022, 2 (8), ⟨10.1007/s43546-022-00253-y⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-05098693

DOI: 10.1007/s43546-022-00253-y

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