2022 French Presidential Election: Different Voting Methods, Different Outcomes?

Élection présidentielle 2022: autres modes de scrutin, autres résultats ?

Antoinette Baujard (), Herrade Igersheim () and Isabelle Lebon ()
Additional contact information
Antoinette Baujard: UJM - Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Étienne, GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon - Saint-Etienne - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - UJM - Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Étienne - EM - EMLyon Business School - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
Herrade Igersheim: CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, BETA - Bureau d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée - AgroParisTech - UNISTRA - Université de Strasbourg - Université de Haute-Alsace (UHA) - Université de Haute-Alsace (UHA) Mulhouse - Colmar - UL - Université de Lorraine - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement
Isabelle Lebon: UNICAEN - Université de Caen Normandie - NU - Normandie Université, CREM - Centre de recherche en économie et management - UNICAEN - Université de Caen Normandie - NU - Normandie Université - UR - Université de Rennes - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

Post-Print from HAL

Abstract: A survey using data representative of the French electorate, carried out as part of the 2022 Voter Autrement operation, enables us to imagine what the outcome of the French presidential election would have been if the voting system had been different. A second survey, this time in situ and non-representative, comes to the same conclusion: the winner would have been the same, whether the voting method was the current one, approval voting, evaluation voting or majority judgment. Beyond this, our analyses lead to two new results. Firstly, our representative data show that the ranking of candidates remains fairly stable between the official vote and two of the multi-nominal votes tested. This convergence, which clearly breaks with the results usually observed in this type of experiment conducted in France since 2002, testifies to the evolution of French voters' perception of the candidates. On the other hand, we highlight the risk of strong discontinuities in the electoral results calculated with majority judgment.

Keywords: Voting; Voting method; Electoral preferences; Approval voting; Evaluative voting; Majority judgment; Vote; Mode de scrutin; Préférences électorales; Vote par approbation; Vote par évaluation; Jugement majoritaire (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025-05-21
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Published in Revue d'économie politique, 2025, 135 (2), pp.271-298. ⟨10.3917/redp.352.0271⟩

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-05158179

DOI: 10.3917/redp.352.0271

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Post-Print from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().