Less Eligibility, Welfare, and Punishment: The Econometric Evidence

François Bonnet ()
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François Bonnet: PACTE - Pacte, Laboratoire de sciences sociales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - UGA - Université Grenoble Alpes - IEPG - Sciences Po Grenoble-UGA - Institut d'études politiques de Grenoble - UGA - Université Grenoble Alpes

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Abstract: The principle of less eligibility posits that assistance must be less attractive than low-wage work, and that punishment must make crime less attractive than low-wage work or welfare. Much of the literature dismisses less eligibility as outdated and reactionary. In fact, less eligibility is neither a doctrine nor a policy prescription. It assumes that individuals respond to incentives based on the relative desirability of low-wage work, assistance, and crime. Maintaining a gap in desirability between these options is structurally necessary to sustain low-wage labor supply and contain crime. The literature on the causal relations that make up less eligibility shows that increased welfare generosity decreases the labor supply for low-wage work; that making low-wage work more desirable reduces crime; and that increased welfare generosity also reduces crime. These effects are supported by a wealth of econometric evidence, suggesting the plausibility of less eligibility through robust microfoundations. The implied trade-offs are objective realities, indifferent towards normative inclinations. The main macro-level implication is to explain the oft-noted but under-theorized inverse relation between welfare and punishment.

Date: 2025
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Published in Crime and Justice, In press, ⟨10.1086/735664⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-05165960

DOI: 10.1086/735664

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