Endogenous Coalitions Formations Through Technology Transfers and Fair Prices

Hélène Ferrer (), Guillermo Owen () and Fabrice Valognes ()
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Hélène Ferrer: CREM - Centre de recherche en économie et management - UNICAEN - Université de Caen Normandie - NU - Normandie Université - UR - Université de Rennes - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
Guillermo Owen: Naval Postgraduate School
Fabrice Valognes: CREM - Centre de recherche en économie et management - UNICAEN - Université de Caen Normandie - NU - Normandie Université - UR - Université de Rennes - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: We consider a situation in which members of an oligopoly have different technologies, which allow them to produce at different costs. Members may license their technology to other members. Using the Aumann-Dreze modification of the Shapley value, we compute fair prices for these licenses. We also study the problem of stability for these ``licensing coalitions.''

Keywords: Cooperative Game Theory; Coalition Formation; Aumann-Dreze Prices (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-05517787v1
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Published in Economics Bulletin, 2026, 46 (1), pp.198-208

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