Revisiting Behavioural Merger Remedies in Dynamic Markets

Patrice Bougette (), Oliver Budzinski and Frédéric Marty ()
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Patrice Bougette: UniCA - Université Côte d'Azur, GREDEG - Groupe de Recherche en Droit, Economie et Gestion - UNS - Université Nice Sophia Antipolis (1965 - 2019) - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - UniCA - Université Côte d'Azur
Frédéric Marty: GREDEG - Groupe de Recherche en Droit, Economie et Gestion - UNS - Université Nice Sophia Antipolis (1965 - 2019) - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - UniCA - Université Côte d'Azur, OFCE - Observatoire français des conjonctures économiques (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po, CIRANO - Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en analyse des organisations [Montréal, Canada] = Center for Interuniversity Research and Analysis on Organizations [Montréal, Canada]

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Abstract: Digital platforms, ecosystems, and Research&Development-intensive industries challenge conventional, one-shot merger control. In fast-evolving markets, competitive constraints and innovation trajectories can shift after clearance, while behavioral commitments – often imposed for long durations – are exposed to obsolescence, moral hazard during implementation, and adverse selection rooted in imperfect information at notification. We propose a conceptual model of adaptive merger control that introduces structured ex post flexibility through a review clause attached to conditional clearance. The clause can be activated within a predefined window when observable triggers indicate that the original package has become ineffective or disproportionate. We outline governance options for initiation by authorities, merging parties, or affected stakeholders; information tools for dynamic counterfactuals; and a continuum of remedy designs distinguishing fixed commitments, adaptable behavioral remedies, and regulation-like constraints. The framework highlights two symmetric enforcement errors – excessive restraint and excessive precaution – and shows how adaptive design can mitigate both while preserving legal certainty via transparent procedures and bounded discretion. We discuss implementation challenges, including monitoring capacity, strategic gaming, and the potential transition from behavioral to structural measures. The article provides a framework for remedy design in dynamic markets and for the assessment of merger chains in digital and innovation markets.

Keywords: European Union; Merger Waves; Mergers & Acquisitions; Digital Markets; Innovation; Legal Uncertainty; Dynamic Competition; Behavioural Remedies; Merger Remedies; Merger Control (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026-03-27
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Published in World Competition, 2026, 49 (1), pp.45-76

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Related works:
Working Paper: Revisiting Behavioral Merger Remedies in Dynamic Markets (2026)
Working Paper: Revisiting Behavioural Merger Remedies in Dynamic Markets (2026)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-05571210

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