Interplay between security providers, consumers, and attackers: a weighted congestion game approach

Patrick Maillé (), Peter Reichl () and Bruno Tuffin ()
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Patrick Maillé: RSM - Département Réseaux, Sécurité et Multimédia - UEB - Université européenne de Bretagne - European University of Brittany - Télécom Bretagne - IMT - Institut Mines-Télécom [Paris]
Peter Reichl: FTW - Telecommunications Research Center Vienna [Autriche]
Bruno Tuffin: DIONYSOS - Dependability Interoperability and perfOrmance aNalYsiS Of networkS - Centre Inria de l'Université de Rennes - Inria - Institut National de Recherche en Informatique et en Automatique - IRISA-D2 - RÉSEAUX, TÉLÉCOMMUNICATION ET SERVICES - IRISA - Institut de Recherche en Informatique et Systèmes Aléatoires - UR - Université de Rennes - INSA Rennes - Institut National des Sciences Appliquées - Rennes - INSA - Institut National des Sciences Appliquées - UBS - Université de Bretagne Sud - ENS Rennes - École normale supérieure - Rennes - Inria - Institut National de Recherche en Informatique et en Automatique - Télécom Bretagne - CentraleSupélec - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: Network users can choose among different security solutions to protect their data. Those solutions are offered by competing providers, with possibly different performance and price levels. In this paper, we model the interactions among users as a noncooperative game, with a negative externality coming from the fact that attackers target popular systems to maximize their expected gain. Using a nonatomic weighted congestion game model for user interactions, we prove the existence and uniqueness of a user equilibrium, compute the corresponding Price of Anarchy, that is the loss of efficiency due to user selfishness, and investigate some consequences for the (higher-level) pricing game played by security providers.

Keywords: Game theory; Weighted games; Security (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-11-14
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://inria.hal.science/inria-00560807v1
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Published in GameSec - Second International Conference on Decision and Game Theory for Security, Nov 2011, College Park, MD, Maryland, United States. pp.67-86, ⟨10.1007/978-3-642-25280-8_8⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:inria-00560807

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-25280-8_8

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