Les modèles de comportements adaptatifs appliqués à l'oligopole de Cournot

Pascal Billand and Christophe Bravard ()
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Christophe Bravard: CREUSET - Centre de Recherche Economique de l'Université de Saint-Etienne - UJM - Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Étienne

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Abstract: This paper examines a recurrent oligopoly game, where firms imitate the most successful behaviors in their memory. We intend to characterize stochastically stable states. Several models are considered which differ in the specification of players' memory. We note that the specification of memory plays a key role in the selection of the stochastically stable states. Moreover, in most cases, the Cournot-Nash equilibrium is not the unique stochastically stable state, and there exist cases where this equilibrium does not belong to the set of stochastically stable states.

Keywords: Cournot Oligopoly; Evolutionary Games; Imitation; Oligopole de Cournot; jeux évolutionnaires (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://ujm.hal.science/ujm-00121658v1
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Published in Revue d'économie industrielle , 2006, 114-115, pp.161-183

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Journal Article: Les modèles de comportements adaptatifs appliqués à l'oligopole de Cournot (2006)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:ujm-00121658

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