A live experiment on approval voting

Jean-François Laslier and Karine Van der Straeten ()

PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) from HAL

Abstract: This paper presents a large-scale experiment on the Approval Voting rule that took place during the 2002 French presidential election. We describe the experiment and its main results. The findings are as follows: (i) Such an experiment is feasible, and very well accepted by voters. (ii) The principle of approval voting is easily understood and accepted. (iii) Within the observed political context, compared to the official first-round vote, approval voting modifies the overall ranking of candidates. (iv) The candidates Le Pen and Chirac, more than the others, were able to convert approval votes into official first-round votes.

Keywords: Approval voting; French politics; Experiments; Voting rules (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (36)

Published in Experimental Economics, 2008, 11, pp.97-105. ⟨10.1007/s10683-006-9149-6⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:pseptp:hal-00363212

DOI: 10.1007/s10683-006-9149-6

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