Bezalel Peleg and Hans Peters: Strategic Social Choice. Stable Representations of Constitutions, Studies in choice and welfare, Springer, 2010, 154 pp

Agnieszka Rusinowska

PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) from HAL

Abstract: This is a review on the book by Bezalel Peleg and Hans Peters: Strategic Social Choice. Stable Representations of Constitutions.

Date: 2013-02
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-00666816v1
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Published in Social Choice and Welfare, 2013, 40 (2), pp.631-634. ⟨10.1007/s00355-011-0595-5⟩

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Working Paper: Bezalel Peleg and Hans Peters: Strategic Social Choice. Stable Representations of Constitutions, Studies in choice and welfare, Springer, 2010, 154 pp (2013)
Working Paper: Bezalel Peleg and Hans Peters: Strategic Social Choice. Stable Representations of Constitutions, Studies in choice and welfare, Springer, 2010, 154 pp (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:pseptp:hal-00666816

DOI: 10.1007/s00355-011-0595-5

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