Repeated Games with Complete Information

Olivier Gossner and Tristan Tomala
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Olivier Gossner: PSE - Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, PSE - Paris School of Economics - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement

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Keywords: Repeated Games; Complete Information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Published in R. A. Meyers. Computational Complexity - Theory, Techniques and Applications, Springer, pp.2620-2634, 2012

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Working Paper: Repeated Games with Complete Information (2012)
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