Learning in the trust game

Claude Meidinger (claude.meidinger@gmail.com) and Antoine Terracol
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Claude Meidinger: CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: We use experimental data from a repeated trust game to estimate structural learning models that allow a differentiation of the learning processes of the two players. We find that the two players cannot be described by the same learning process. Long run simulations then show that the interaction of the two estimated types of players can lead to contrasted outcomes.

Keywords: simulations; Learning; beliefs; reinforcment; simulations. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Published in Revue de Philosophie Economique / Review of Economic Philosophy, 2012, 13 (1), pp.155-174

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Working Paper: Learning in the trust game (2012)
Working Paper: Learning in the trust game (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:pseptp:hal-00728296

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