Civic Vitue and Labor Market Institutions

Yann Algan and Pierre Cahuc

PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) from HAL

Abstract: We argue civic virtue plays as a key role in explaining the design of public insurance against unemployment risks by solving moral hazard issues wich hinder the efficiency of unemployement insurance. We show, in a simple model, that economies with stronger civic virtues are more prone to provide insurance through unemployment benefits rather than though job protection. We provide cross-country and the design of unemployment benefits and employment protection in OECD countries over the period 1980 to 2003. We then use an epidemiological approach to estimate the existence of a potential causal relationship from inherited civic virtue to labor market insurance instituion.

Date: 2009
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Published in American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, 2009, 1 (1), pp.111-145. ⟨10.1257/mac.1.1.111⟩

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Journal Article: Civic Virtue and Labor Market Institutions (2009)
Working Paper: Civic Virtue and Labor Markets Institutions (2009)
Working Paper: Civic Vitue and Labor Market Institutions (2009)
Working Paper: Civic Virtue and Labor Market Institutions (2009)
Working Paper: Civic Virtue and Labor Market Institutions (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:pseptp:hal-00812847

DOI: 10.1257/mac.1.1.111

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