A Theory of Urban Squatting and Land-Tenure Formalization in Developing Countries

Jan Brueckner and Harris Selod ()

PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) from HAL

Abstract: This paper offers a new theoretical approach to urban squatting, reflecting the view that squatters and formal residents compete for land within a city. The key implication is that squatters "squeeze" the formal market, raising the price paid by formal residents. The squatter organizer ensures that squeezing is not too severe, since otherwise, the formal price will rise to a level that invites eviction by landowners. Because eviction is absent in equilibrium, the model differs from previous analytical frameworks, where eviction occurs with some probability. It also facilitates a general equilibrium analysis of squatter formalization policies.

Keywords: PAYS; EN; DEVELOPPEMENT (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-02
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (48)

Published in American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 2009, 1 (1), pp.28-51. ⟨10.1257/pol.1.1.28⟩

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
Journal Article: A Theory of Urban Squatting and Land-Tenure Formalization in Developing Countries (2009)
Working Paper: A Theory of Urban Squatting and Land-Tenure Formalization in Developing Countries (2009)
Working Paper: A Theory of Urban Squatting and Land-Tenure Formalization in Developing Countries (2008)
Working Paper: A Theory of Urban Squatting and Land-Tenure Formalization in Developing Countries (2008)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:pseptp:hal-00813126

DOI: 10.1257/pol.1.1.28

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Caroline Bauer ().