Multiagent belief revision

Antoine Billot, Jean-Christophe Vergnaud and Bernard Walliser

PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) from HAL

Abstract: An original epistemic framework is proposed for the modeling of beliefs and messages within a multiagent belief setting. This framework enables public, private and secret messages as well, even when the latter contains errors. A revising rule—i.e. the product rule—is introduced in pure epistemic terms in order to be applied to all structures and message. Since any syntactic structure can be expressed through various semantic ones, an equivalence principle is given by use of the semantic notion of bisimilarity. Thereafter, a robustness result proves that, for a given prior structure, bisimilar messages yield bisimilar posterior structures (Theorem 1). In syntax, the beliefs revised thanks to the product rule are then shown to be unique (Theorem 2). Finally, an equivalence theorem is established between the product rule and the Belief-Message Inference axiom (Theorem 3).

Keywords: belief; belief revision; epistemic logics; game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-08
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Published in Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2015, 59, pp.47-57. ⟨10.1016/j.jmateco.2015.05.004⟩

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
Journal Article: Multiagent belief revision (2015)
Working Paper: Multiagent belief revision (2015)
Working Paper: Multiagent belief revision (2015)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:pseptp:hal-01175921

DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2015.05.004

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Caroline Bauer ().