Tradable Refugee-admission Quotas and EU Asylum Policy

Jesús Fernández-Huertas Moraga and Hillel Rapoport ()

PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) from HAL

Abstract: The current European Union (EU) asylum policy is widely seen as ineffective and unfair. We propose an EU-wide market for tradable quotas on both refugees and asylum seekers coupled with a matching mechanism linking countries' and migrants' preferences. We show that the proposed system can go a long way towards addressing the shortcomings of the current system. We illustrate this claim using the recent problems regarding relocation faced by the European Relocation from Malta program.

Keywords: immigration policy; EU policy; tradable quotas; refugee resettlement; asylum seekers; international public goods (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-09
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

Published in CESifo Economic Studies, 2015, 61 (3-4), pp.638-672. ⟨10.1093/cesifo/ifu037⟩

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Related works:
Journal Article: Tradable Refugee-admission Quotas and EU Asylum Policy (2015)
Working Paper: Tradable Refugee-admission Quotas and EU Asylum Policy (2015)
Working Paper: Tradable Refugee-admission Quotas and EU Asylum Policy (2015)
Working Paper: Tradable Refugee-Admission Quotas and EU Asylum Policy (2014)
Working Paper: Tradable Refugee-Admission Quotas and EU Asylum Policy (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:pseptp:hal-01304179

DOI: 10.1093/cesifo/ifu037

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