Simple bounds on the value of a reputation

Olivier Gossner

PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) from HAL

Abstract: We introduce entropy techniques to study the classical reputation model in which a long-run player faces a series of short-run players. The long-run player's actions are possibly imperfectly observed. We derive explicit lower and upper bounds on the equilibrium payoffs to the long-run player.

Keywords: Reputation; Repeated games; Incomplete information; Relative entropy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-09
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00654683v1
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (26)

Published in Econometrica, 2011, 79 (5), pp.1627-1641. ⟨10.3982/ECTA9385⟩

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Related works:
Journal Article: Simple Bounds on the Value of a Reputation (2011)
Working Paper: Simple bounds on the value of a reputation (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:pseptp:halshs-00654683

DOI: 10.3982/ECTA9385

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