Core-selecting package auctions: a comment on revenue-monotonicity

Laurent Lamy

PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) from HAL

Abstract: Day and Milgrom (Int J Game Theory 36:393-407, 2008) argue that package auctions that select the seller's minimum revenue in the Core are revenue-monotone. We show that no bidder-optimal Core-selecting auction can satisfy revenue-monotonicity for general preferences when there are at least three goods for sale, while the property holds for any bidder-optimal Core-selecting auction in environments with only two goods or if the characteristic function is submodular.

Keywords: Core; Auctions; Core-selection auctions; Package bidding; Combinatorial bidding (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-07
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

Published in International Journal of Game Theory, 2010, 39 (3), pp.503-510. ⟨10.1007/s00182-009-0188-z⟩

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Related works:
Journal Article: Core-selecting package auctions: a comment on revenue-monotonicity (2010)
Working Paper: Core-selecting package auctions: a comment on revenue-monotonicity (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:pseptp:halshs-00754436

DOI: 10.1007/s00182-009-0188-z

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