On minimal ascending auctions with payment discounts

Laurent Lamy

PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) from HAL

Abstract: The literature on ascending combinatorial auctions yields conflicting insights regarding the possibility to implement the Vickrey payoffs for general valuations. We introduce the class of minimal ascending auctions, a class which allows one to disconnect the final payments from the final bids but which prohibits the raising of the price vector of a provisionally winning bidder. We first establish the impossibility of implementing the Vickrey payoffs for general valuations. Second, we propose a minimal ascending auction that yields a bidder-optimal competitive equilibrium thanks to payment discounts.

Keywords: Ascending auctions; Combinatorial auctions; Bidder-optimal competitive equilibrium; Core-selecting auctions; Vickrey payoffs (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-07
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Published in Games and Economic Behavior, 2012, 75 (2), pp.990-999. ⟨10.1016/j.geb.2012.02.005⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:pseptp:halshs-00754581

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2012.02.005

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