Taxes, minimum-quality standards and/or product labeling to improve environmental quality and welfare: Experiments can provide answers

Anne-Célia Disdier and Stéphan Marette ()

PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) from HAL

Abstract: This study focuses on the welfare impact of taxes, minimum-quality standards, and/or product labeling. A theoretical framework shows that the combination of a label and a per-unit tax is socially optimal. Alternatively, if the label is unavailable, the theory cannot directly conclude which instrument should be socially preferred. Estimations of willingness-to-pay (WTP) are useful for completing the theoretical analysis and evaluating policies ex ante on case-by-case basis. Using hypothetical WTP for shrimp, we confirm that the combination of a label and a tax is socially optimal. In the absence of a label, simulations show that a minimum-quality standard leads to a higher welfare compared to a tax.

Keywords: Regulatory instruments; Environment; Stated preference experiment; Willingness-to-pay (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-06
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (15)

Published in Journal of Regulatory Economics, 2012, 41 (3), pp.337-357. ⟨10.1007/s11149-011-9167-y⟩

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Journal Article: Taxes, minimum-quality standards and/or product labeling to improve environmental quality and welfare: Experiments can provide answers (2012)
Working Paper: Taxes, minimum-quality standards and/or product labeling to improve environmental quality and welfare: Experiments can provide answers (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:pseptp:halshs-00754589

DOI: 10.1007/s11149-011-9167-y

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