An Exploration of Type Indeterminacy in Strategic Decision-making

Jérôme Busemeyer and Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky ()
Additional contact information
Jérôme Busemeyer: Indiana University - Indiana University [Bloomington] - Indiana University System
Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky: PJSE - Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, PSE - Paris School of Economics - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement

PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) from HAL

Abstract: In this paper we explore an extension of the Type Indeterminacy model of decision-making to strategic decision-making. A 2×2 game is investigated. We first show that in a one-shot simultaneous move setting the TI-model is equivalent to the standard Bayes-Harsanyi model. We then let the game be preceded by a cheap-talk promise game. We show in an example that in the TI-model the promise stage can have an impact on the next following behavior when the standard Bayes-Harsanyi model predicts no impact whatsoever. The TI approach differs from other behavioral approaches in identifying the source of the effect of cheap-talk promises in the intrinsic indeterminacy of the players' type.

Date: 2009
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Published in Quantum Interaction, 2009, 5494, pp.113-128

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:pseptp:halshs-00754784

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Caroline Bauer ().