Sampling best response dynamics and deterministic equilibrium selection

Daisuke Oyama, William Sandholm and Olivier Tercieux ()
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Olivier Tercieux: PSE - Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, PSE - Paris School of Economics - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement

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Abstract: We consider a model of evolution in games in which a revising agent observes the actions of a random number of randomly sampled opponents and then chooses a best response to the distribution of actions in the sample. We provide a condition on the distribution of sample sizes under which an iterated p-dominant equilibrium is almost globally asymptotically stable under these dynamics. We show under an additional condition on the sample size distribution that in supermodular games, an almost globally asymptotically stable state must be an iterated p-dominant equilibrium. Since our selection results are for deterministic dynamics, any selected equilibrium is reached quickly; the long waiting times associated with equilibrium selection in stochastic stability models are absent.

Keywords: equilibrium selection; Evolutionary game dynamics; almost global convergence; iterated p-dominance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-01
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-01157537v1
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (35)

Published in Theoretical Economics, 2015, 10 (1), pp.243-281. ⟨10.3982/TE1405⟩

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Journal Article: Sampling best response dynamics and deterministic equilibrium selection (2015)
Working Paper: Sampling best response dynamics and deterministic equilibrium selection (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:pseptp:halshs-01157537

DOI: 10.3982/TE1405

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