Quality of Education and the Number of Students: A General-Equilibrium Analysis

Gabrielle Demange, Robert Fenge and Silke Uebelmesser

PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) from HAL

Abstract: For a closed economy, we analyze the relation between the quality of higher education and the number of students. Within a two-period general-equilibrium model, we derive the optimal education policy – i.e., quality of and access restrictions to higher education – with observable ability, and contrast this with a setting where ability is unobservable and financial instruments are restricted to either taxes or fees. If the number of students increases with quality, then there are too many students with tax financing and the quality level is too low – and vice versa with fee financing. Results are not clear-cut when higher quality leads to a lower number of students.

Keywords: higher education; education policy; Student (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-09
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Published in Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 2015, 171 (3), pp.456-477. ⟨10.1628/093245615X14285667557478⟩

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Related works:
Journal Article: Quality of Education and the Number of Students: A General-Equilibrium Analysis (2015)
Working Paper: Quality of Education and the Number of Students: A General-Equilibrium Analysis (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:pseptp:halshs-01203167

DOI: 10.1628/093245615X14285667557478

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