Multicoalitional solutions

Stéphane Gonzalez () and Michel Grabisch

PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) from HAL

Abstract: The paper proposes a new concept of solution for TU games, called multicoalitional solution, which makes sense in the context of production games, that is, where $v(S)$ is the production or income per unit of time. By contrast to classical solutions where elements of the solution are payoff vectors, multicoalitional solutions give in addition an allocation time to each coalition, which permits to realize the payoff vector. We give two instances of such solutions, called the d-multicoalitional core and the c-multicoalitional core, and both arise as the strong Nash equilibria of two strategic games, where in the first utility per active unit of time is maximized, while in the second it is the utility per total unit of time. We show that the d-core (or aspiration core) of Benett, and the c-core of Guesnerie and Oddou are strongly related to the d-multicoalitional and c-multicoalitional cores, respectively, and that the latter ones can be seen as an implementation of the former ones in a noncooperative framework.

Keywords: Cooperative game; core; aspiration core; strong Nash equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-01293785v1
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Published in Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2016, 64, pp. 1-10

Downloads: (external link)
https://shs.hal.science/halshs-01293785v1/document (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Multicoalitional solutions (2016)
Working Paper: Multicoalitional solutions (2016)
Working Paper: Multicoalitional solutions (2016)
Working Paper: Multicoalitional solutions (2013)
Working Paper: Multicoalitional solutions (2013)
Working Paper: Multicoalitional solutions (2013)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:pseptp:halshs-01293785

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Caroline Bauer ().