A Theory of Political Entrenchment

Saint-Paul, Gilles; Ticchi, Davide; Vindigni, Andréa

A Theory of Political Entrenchment

Gilles Saint-Paul, Davide Ticchi () and Andréa Vindigni
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Andréa Vindigni: Collegio Carlo Alberto - UNITO - Università degli studi di Torino = University of Turin, IMT Institute for Advanced Studies [Lucca]

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Abstract: Can an incumbent political party increase its chances at re-election by implementing inefficient policies that harm its constituency? This paper studies the possibility of such a phenomenon, which we label political entrenchment. We use a two-party dynamic model of redistribution with probabilistic voting. Political entrenchment by the Left occurs only if incumbency rents are sufficiently high. Low-skill citizens may vote for this party even though they rationally expect the adoption of these policies. We discuss: the possibility of entrenchment by the Right; the scope for commitment to avoid entrenchment policies; and the effect of state capacity, income inequality and party popularity on the likelihood of entrenchment. We illustrate our theory with a number of historical examples.

Keywords: Political; Entrenchment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-06
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13)

Published in The Economic Journal, 2016, 126 (593), pp.1238-1263. ⟨10.1111/ecoj.12215⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:pseptp:halshs-01380198

DOI: 10.1111/ecoj.12215

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