 Repeated games with public deterministic monitoringMarie Laclau () and Tristan Tomala PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) from HAL Abstract: We consider repeated games with compact actions sets and pure strategies in which players commonly observe a public signal which reveals imperfectly the action profile. We characterize the set of payoffs profiles that can be sustained by a perfect equilibrium, as players become increasingly patient. There are two conditions: admissibility and joint rationality. An admissibly feasible payoff can be achieved by an action profile that offers no unilateral deviation which is both undetectable and profitable. It is jointly rational if for all weights on players, the weighted average payoff is greater than or equal to the minmax level of the weighted average payoff function. This characterization is alternative to the one provided by the "score method" of Fudenberg and Levine (1994). We provide a simple construction of equilibrium strategies based on cooperation, punishments and rewards. Punishments rely on Blackwell's approachability algorithm. Keywords: Repeated games; Public monitoring; Pure strategies; Approachability (search for similar items in EconPapers) Published in Journal of Economic Theory, 2017, 169, pp.400-424. ⟨10.1016/j.jet.2017.02.011⟩ There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it. Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:pseptp:halshs-01503768 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2017.02.011 Access Statistics for this paper More papers in PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) from HAL |
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