Heuristic voting under the Alternative Vote: the efficiency of `sour grapes’ behavior

Jean-François Laslier

PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) from HAL

Abstract: This theoretical paper contrasts two voting heuristics: overstating and replacing. Under the Alternative Vote, overstating is useless but the replacement heuristics is consequential. The paper argues that the "replacing" manipulation corresponds to a psychologically and politically plausible voter behavior, and study its effects. The conclusion is that the Alternative Vote should not be considered as immune to manipulation.

Keywords: Alternative vote; Single transferable vote; Manipulation; Behavioral voting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-08
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Published in Homo Oeconomicus: Journal of Behavioral and Institutional Economics, 2016, 33 (1), pp.57-76. ⟨10.1007/s41412-016-0001-8⟩

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Related works:
Journal Article: Heuristic Voting Under the Alternative Vote: The Efficiency of “Sour Grapes” Behavior (2016)
Working Paper: Heuristic voting under the Alternative Vote: the efficiency of `sour grapes’ behavior (2016)
Working Paper: Heuristic voting under the Alternative Vote: the efficiency of “sour grapes" behavior (2015)
Working Paper: Heuristic voting under the Alternative Vote: the efficiency of “sour grapes" behavior (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:pseptp:halshs-01518280

DOI: 10.1007/s41412-016-0001-8

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