Rumors and social networks

Francis Bloch, Gabrielle Demange and Rachel Kranton
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Rachel Kranton: Duke University [Durham]

PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) from HAL

Abstract: This article studies the transmission of rumors in social networks. We consider a model with biased and unbiased agents. Biased agents want to enforce a specific decision and unbiased agents to match the true state. One agent learns the true state and sends a message to her neighbors, who decide whether or not to transmit it further. We characterize the perfect Bayesian equilibria of the game, show that the social network can act as a filter, and that biased agents may have an incentive to limit their number.

Date: 2018
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-01631521v1
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (26)

Published in International Economic Review, 2018, 59 (2), ⟨10.1111/iere.12275⟩

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Related works:
Working Paper: Rumors and social networks (2018)
Working Paper: Rumors and Social Networks (2014)
Working Paper: Rumors and Social Networks (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:pseptp:halshs-01631521

DOI: 10.1111/iere.12275

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