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Extracting Information or Resource ? The Hotelling Rule Revisited under Asym- metric Information

David Martimort, Jerome Pouyet and Francesco Ricci

PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) from HAL

Abstract: A concessionaire has private information on the initial stock of resource. A "virtual Hotelling rule" describes how the resource price evolves over time and how extraction costs are compounded with information costs along the optimal extraction path. Fields which are heterogeneous in terms of their initial stocks follow different extraction paths. Resource might be left unexploited in the long run as a way to foster incentives. The optimal contract may sometimes be implemented through royalties and license fees. With a market of concessionaires, asymmetric information leads to a "virtual Herfindahl principle" and to another form of heterogeneity across active concessionaires.

Date: 2018
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

Published in RAND Journal of Economics, 2018, 49 (2), pp.311-347. ⟨10.1111/1756-2171.12233⟩

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Journal Article: Extracting information or resource? The Hotelling rule revisited under asymmetric information (2018) Downloads
Working Paper: Extracting Information or Resource ? The Hotelling Rule Revisited under Asym- metric Information (2018)
Working Paper: Extracting Information or Resource? The Hotelling Rule Revisited under Asymmetric Information (2017) Downloads
Working Paper: Extracting Information or Resource? The Hotelling Rule Revisited under Asymmetric Information (2017) Downloads
Working Paper: Extracting Information or Resource? The Hotelling Rule Revisited under Asymmetric Information (2017) Downloads
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:pseptp:halshs-01631594

DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12233

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