Payoff Equivalence of Efficient Mechanisms in Large Matching Markets

Yeon-Koo Che and Olivier Tercieux ()
Additional contact information
Olivier Tercieux: PSE - Paris School of Economics - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, PJSE - Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) from HAL

Date: 2018-02
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

Published in Theoretical Economics, 2018, 13 (1)

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
Working Paper: Payoff Equivalence of Efficient Mechanisms in Large Matching Markets (2018)
Working Paper: Payoff Equivalence of Efficient Mechanisms in Large Matching Markets (2015)
Working Paper: Payoff Equivalence of Efficient Mechanisms in Large Matching Markets (2015)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:pseptp:halshs-01631682

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Caroline Bauer ().