Sincere voting, strategic voting: A laboratory experiment using alternative proportional systems

Antoinette Baujard, Herrade Igersheim, Frédéric Gavrel, Jean-François Laslier and Isabelle Lebon

PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) from HAL

Abstract: Strategic voting is classically defined as voting for one's second preferred option to prevent one's least preferred option from winning when one's first preference has no chance. Voters want their votes to be effective, and casting a ballot that will have no influence on an election is undesirable. Thus, some voters cast strategic ballots when they decide that doing so is useful.This edited volume includes case studies of strategic voting behavior in Israel, Germany, Japan, Belgium, Spain, Switzerland, Canada, and the United Kingdom, providing a conceptual framework for understanding strategic voting behavior in all types of electoral systems. The classic definition explicitly considers strategic voting in a single race with at least three candidates and a single winner. This situation is more common in electoral systems that have single-member districts that employ plurality or majoritarian electoral rules and have multiparty systems. Indeed, much of the literature on strategic voting to date has considered elections in Canada and the United Kingdom. This book contributes to a more general understanding of strategic voting behavior by taking into account a wide variety of institutional contexts, such as single transferable vote rules, proportional representation, two-round elections, and mixed electoral systems.

Keywords: Elections; Strategic; Laboratory experiment; Proportional system (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Published in John Aldrich; André Blais; Laura B. Stephenson. The Many Faces of Strategic Voting, Chapitre 10, The University of Michigan Press, pp.203-231, 2018, 978-0-472-13102-0. ⟨10.3998/mpub.9946117⟩

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Related works:
Working Paper: Sincere voting, strategic voting A laboratory experiment using alternative proportional systems (2018)
Working Paper: Sincere voting, strategic voting: A laboratory experiment using alternative proportional systems (2018)
Working Paper: Sincere Voting, Strategic Voting A Laboratory Experiment Using Alternative Proportional Systems (2018)
Working Paper: Sincere Voting, Strategic Voting A Laboratory Experiment Using Alternative Proportional Systems (2018)
Working Paper: Sincere voting, strategic voting A laboratory experiment using alternative proportional systems (2018)
Working Paper: Sincere voting, strategic voting A laboratory experiment using alternative proportional systems (2018)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:pseptp:halshs-01652699

DOI: 10.3998/mpub.9946117

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