New Electoral Systems and Old Referendums

Gabrielle Demange

PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) from HAL

Abstract: I discuss the future of social choice theory in the design of electoral systems. Two routes are promising. First, thanks to computing facilities, new voting procedures can be designed. I present two positive recent experiments, and hope some are to come. Second, the well-known referendum, which is being increasingly popular on a variety of situations, needs to be investigated more thoroughly; I discuss some issues and directions for improvement.

Date: 2019-11
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Published in Jean-François Laslier; Hervé Moulin; M. Remzi Sanver; William S. Zwicker. The Future of Economic Design, pp.67-73, 2019, ⟨10.1007/978-3-030-18050-8_11⟩

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Related works:
Working Paper: New Electoral Systems and Old Referendums (2019)
Working Paper: New electoral systems and old referendums (2018)
Working Paper: New electoral systems and old referendums (2018)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:pseptp:halshs-02491873

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-18050-8_11

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