The Regulatory State: The Power of Not Having the Power to Act

L’État régulateur: le pouvoir de ne pas toujours pouvoir

David Martimort

PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) from HAL

Abstract: In the light of the theory of incentives, the state is here considered as a chain of contracts between the citizen, the politician, the bureaucrat and the economic sphere. Yet, the incomplete character of these contracts shapes the forms of public action. This essay illustrates how the link between the citizen and the politician is thereby weakened, and the democratic implication of the citizen threatened.

Date: 2021
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Published in Pouvoirs - Revue française d’études constitutionnelles et politiques, 2021, 2021/2 (177), pp.95-108. ⟨10.3917/pouv.177.0095⟩

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Working Paper: The Regulatory State: The Power of Not Having the Power to Act (2021)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:pseptp:halshs-03231044

DOI: 10.3917/pouv.177.0095

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