 The analogical foundations of cooperationPhilippe Jehiel () and
Larry Samuelson
PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) from HAL Abstract: We offer an approach to cooperation in repeated games of private monitoring in which players construct models of their opponents' behavior by observing the frequencies of play in a record of past plays of the game in which actions but not signals are recorded. Players construct models of their opponent's behavior by grouping the histories in the record into a relatively small number of analogy classes for which they estimate probabilities of cooperation. The incomplete record and the limited number of analogy classes lead to misspecified models that provide the incentives to cooperate. We provide conditions for the existence of equilibria supporting cooperation and equilibria supporting high payoffs for some nontrivial analogy partitions. Keywords: Analogical reasoning; Cooperation; Prisoners' dilemma; Repeated game; Private monitoring (search for similar items in EconPapers) Published in Journal of Economic Theory, 2023, 208, ⟨10.1016/j.jet.2023.105609⟩ There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it. Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:pseptp:halshs-04331552 DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2023.105609 Access Statistics for this paper More papers in PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) from HAL |
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