Stable outcomes in simple cooperative games

Gabrielle Demange

PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) from HAL

Abstract: In a cooperative game, coalitions are the fundamental behavioral units. Stable outcomes (in the core) are those blocked by no coalition. This paper has two objectives. First, building on the notion of intermediate preferences indexed by a median graph, I unify and extend previous results on the existence of stable outcomes in simple games. Second, I review how and when the core approach applies in more general settings and may help to predict the stable splitting of a whole group into disjoint coalitions.

Keywords: Simple games; Coalitions; Median graph; Tree; Intermediate preferences; Condorcet (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024-04
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Published in Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2024, 111, ⟨10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.102960⟩

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
Journal Article: Stable outcomes in simple cooperative games (2024)
Working Paper: Stable outcomes in simple cooperative games (2024)
Working Paper: Stable outcomes in simple cooperative games (2024)
Working Paper: Stable outcomes in simple cooperative games (2024)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:pseptp:halshs-04571264

DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.102960

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Caroline Bauer ().